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Intestate Succession for Stepchildren:




"There is certainly, therefore, no injustice done to individuals,
whatever be the path of descent marked out by the municipal law."1
- Sir William Blackstone
"Then one day when the lady met this fellow
And they knew that it was much more than a hunch
That this crew must somehow form a family;
That's the way they all became the Brady Bunch!"
- Theme from "The Brady Bunch"
Did Mike Brady ever adopt those three precious little girls, all of
them having hair of gold like their mother?2 We know that they used
his surname and that he was as "fatherly" as any father could be. But
did Mike ever actually go before a judge and declare that the law
should consider him their natural father? If he didn't, should the law
allow Marcia, Jan, and Cindy to claim a portion of Mike's intestate
estate?
3
* J.D. Candidate, 1996. This Note is dedicated to Kimberly Regalado, my friend, my
wife, and my muse. I would also like to thank my parents, Nancy and Dale Hanson, for the
love, support, and opportunities that they have given me. Finally, thanks to Professor Gail
Boreman Bird for her comments on this Note.
1. 2 WILLiAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARiES *211
2. Obviously, Carol Brady could serve just as easily as the principal in this
illustration.
3. Property passes through intestate succession "when a property owner dies without
a will, leaves a will which is totally or partially ineffective, or by his or her will directs that
the property be distributed according to the intestate laws." JOHN RrrcHm ET AL., CASES
AND MATERIALS ON DECEDENTS' ESTATES AND TRUSTS 88 (8th ed. 1993). A 1978 study
sponsored by the American Bar Foundation found that 55% of those surveyed had not
prepared a will, and that based on prior studies the number of people who die intestate
may be even higher. Mary Louise Fellows, et al., Public Attitudes About Property Distribu-
tion at Death and Intestate Succession Laws in the United States, 1978 AM. B. FouND. REs.
J. 319, 337, 337 n.65. This is especially true for poorer, less educated Americans. Id. at 338;
see also RrrcHm, supra at 89 (noting that "older, wealthier, more educated persons are
likely to have a will").
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Courts and legislatures have traditionally answered this question
with a resounding no. In the 1951 case of In re Berge's Estate,4 for
example, the Minnesota Supreme Court had this to say:
Simply that a child of another is received into a home, cared for,
and educated until the age of 16 years, cannot well indicate that
such a child has further claims upon those who so took it in. No
doubt such a child has received much more than it has parted with.5
Such a statement seems harsh, but an examination of the pur-
poses of intestate succession laws shows that the court's reasoning is
not entirely unjustifiable. Intestacy laws are designed both to act as a
substitute for the unknown testamentary intent of the decedent and
also to provide a clear and efficient means of transferring wealth.6
When a particular familial structure is predominant, an intestacy
scheme can serve both of these purposes by assuming that a decedent
would wish to limit distribution of his or her estate to those family
members who fit the dominant pattern. For most of Anglo-American
history, of course, the dominant familial pattern was that which has
come to be known as the traditional or nuclear family.7 Children who
were raised in such a family were naturally included in the intestacy
scheme. Stepchildren, on the other hand, were naturally cut out.8
At the time of the Berge decision, the traditional family was still
the predominant familial unit in America. Divorce and remarriage,
which directly influence the living arrangements of children,9 were at
low levels in the 1950s, l0 meaning that the vast majority of the com-
munity was composed of traditional families. To reflect this common
social familial composition, intestacy laws anticipated that most peo-
ple would want to leave their property to their spouses and their bio-
logical children. As a result, the law did not recognize relationships
4. 47 N.W. 2d 428 (Minn. 1951).
5. Id. at 431 (quoting In re Hack's Estate, 207 N.W. 17, 18 (Minn. 1926)).
6. Cristy G. Lomenzo, Note, A Goal-Based Approach to Drafting Intestacy Provi-
sions for Heirs Other than Surviving Spouses, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 941, 945-48 (1995); Mar-
garet M. Mahoney, Stepfamilies in the Law of Intestate Succession and Wills, 22 U.C. DAVIS
L. REV. 917, 918 (1989) [hereinafter Mahoney, Stepfamilies in the Law]; Fellows, supra
note 3, at 321; RrrCHIE, supra note 3, at 89.
7. This Note uses "traditional family" to denote those consisting of two parents with
whom all of the children have a biological and/or adoptive relationship. The "stepfamily" is
one in which the biological or adopted children of one parent have no biological or legal
relationship with the other parent.
8. See Mahoney, Stepfamilies in the Law, supra note 6, at 919-20 (noting that
stepfamilies have historically not fared well in the law of intestate succession).
9. Louisa F. Miller & Jeanne E. Moorman, Married Couple Families With Children,
in BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, SERIES P-23, No. 162, STUDIES IN
MARRIAGE AND THE FAMILY 27, 29 (1989); ARLENE F. SALUTER, BUREAU OF THE CEN-
sus, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, SERIES P-23, No. 163, CHANGES IN AMERICAN FAMILY
LIFE 14 (1989).
10. SALUTER, supra note 9, at 7.
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such as the one between Mike Brady and his stepdaughters absent a
formal adoption.
The structure of the American family, however, has changed dra-
matically since the days of Berge." Divorce rates exploded in the six-
ties and seventies,' 2 remained very high throughout the eighties,13 and
have continued to rise in the nineties.14 Remarriage rates also in-
creased dramatically in the early sixties' s and rose throughout the sev-
enties and into the eighties. 6 The result has been a decline in the
number of children living in traditional families17 and a rise in the
number of children in stepfamilies.' 8
11. See Gary B. Melton, Children, Families, and the Courts in the Twenty-First Cen-
tury, 66 S. CAL. L. REv. 1993, 1994-96 (1993); Carolyn R. Glick, Note, The Spousal Share
in Intestate Succession: Stepparents are Getting Shortchanged, 74 MmN. L. REV. 631, 631
(1990); Sol Lovas, When is a Family Not a Family? Inheritance and the Taxation of Inheri-
tance within the Non-Traditional Family, 24 IDAHo L. REv. 353, 353 (1987-88).
12. TERRY LUGAILA, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, SERIES P-
23, No. 181, HOUSEHOLDS, FAMILIES, AND CHILDREN: A 30-YEAR PERSPECrIVE 8 (1992);
SALUTER, supra note 9, at 7; Katharine T. Bartlett, Rethinking Parenthood as an Exclusive
Status: The Need for Legal Alternatives when the Premise of the Nuclear Family Has Failed,
70 VA. L. REV. 879, 881 n.7 (1984) (citing Preston, Estimating the Proportion of American
Marriages That End in Divorce, 3 Soc. METHODS AND RESEARCH 435, 436, 457-59 (1975));
Margaret M. Mahoney, Support and Custody Aspects of the Stepparent-Child Relationship,
70 CoNELL L. REV. 38, 38 n.1 (1984) [hereinafter Mahoney, Support and Custody As-
pects] (citing OFFICE OF HUmAN DEv. SERVS., U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERV-
ICES, HELPING YOUTH AND FA~mIS OF SEPARATION, DIVORCE, AND REMARRIAGE 3
(1980)).
13. LUGAILA, supra note 12, at 8; ARTHUR J. NORTON AND LOUISA F. MILLER, Bu-
REAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, SERIES P-23, No. 180, MARRIAGE, DI-
VORCE, AND REMARRIAGE IN THE 1990s 1-6 (1992); Mahoney, Stepfamilies in the Law,
supra note 6, at 917-918 n.2.
14. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T. OF COMMERCE, STATISnCAL ABSTRACr OF
THE UNITED STATES 55 (1994). According to these Census Bureau statistics, the divorce
rate rose from 8.3% in 1990 to 8.9% in 1993. Id
15. SALUTER, supra note 9, at 7.
16. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF
THE UNITED STATES 85 (1989).
17. The rise in the number of children living outside traditional nuclear families has
been nothing short of phenomenal. One commentator noted that in 1982, 25% of minor
children did not live with both biological parents, and went on to cite authorities that esti-
mated the number could rise to 40% by 1990. Bartlett, supra note 12, at 880-81. A more
recent study confirms that in the summer of 1991 nearly 50% of American children lived in
a situation other than the traditional nuclear family. STACY FURUKAWA, BUREAU OF THE
CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, SERIES P70-38, THE DIVERSE LIVING ARRANGE-
MENTS OF CHILDREN: SUMMER 1991 1-4 (1994).
18. One Census Bureau study found that in 1985 about 19% of all married-couple
families were stepfamilies, which was up from 16% only five years earlier. Miller and
Moorman, supra note 9, at 29. The same study found that 15% of all children (in married-
couple families in 1985) were stepchildren, up from 13% in 1980. Id. The most recent data
indicate that in the early 1990s approximately 16% of all children lived in stepfamilies.
NORTON AND MILLER, supra note 13, at 11-12; LUGAILA, supra note 12, at 38. One study
notes that "it has been estimated that about one-quarter of children today will live with a
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Despite the proliferation of stepfamilies and the decline of the
traditional family, the intestacy laws of most states are still structured
as if the traditional family is the dominant social familial unit.19 Be-
cause inheritance rights hinge on the marital relationship and the par-
ent-child relationship,20 basing an intestacy scheme on the traditional
family means that stepchildren either do not inherit or only inherit
when property would otherwise escheat. 21 In other words, stepchil-
dren are still excluded from the laws of intestate succession,22 despite
the fact that meaningful familial relationships can and do develop be-
tween stepparents and stepchildren. And Sir Blackstone notwith-
standing, injustice is done when stepchildren with legitimate intestacy
claims23 are thwarted by out-of-date laws.
California is the only state that has attempted to rectify this out-
right rejection of stepchild intestacy claims. Under section 6454 of the
California Probate Code, stepchildren under certain circumstances
have a parent-child relationship with their stepparent so that they may
inherit by intestate succession as would a biological or adopted child.
24
Unfortunately, two California courts of appeal have interpreted a key
stepparent by the time they have reached 16 years of age." Miller and Moorman, supra
note 9, at 27 (citing Nicholas Zill, Behavior, Achievement, and Health Problems Among
Children in Stepfamilies: Findings From a National Survey of Child Health, in THE IMPACT
OF DIVORCE, SINGLE PARENTING AND STEPPARENTING ON CHILDREN 325, (E. Mavis
Hetherington and Josephine D. Arasteh eds., 1988)).
19. Glick, supra note 11, at 631-2; Lovas, supra note 11, at 353. For example, Uniform
Probate Code section 2-103 provides that the intestate share for heirs other than the dece-
dent's spouse shall pass first to the decedent's descendants, then to the decedent's parents,
then to descendants of the decedent's parents, and finally to the decedent's grandparents
and their descendants. U.P.C. § 2-103 (1991). The Official Comment to this recently
amended section indicates that the word "descendants" is used instead of "issue" to recog-
nize that in certain situations adopted children may inherit, id., but nowhere indicates that
unadopted stepchildren would fare any better under this modem statute than they did
under traditional intestacy statutes that focused strictly on blood relationships. For further
discussion of traditional and modem intestacy statutes, see infra notes 33-42 and accompa-
nying text.
20. Lovas, supra note 11, at 355
21. For a general review of particularized state intestacy statutes which deal with
stepchildren, see Mahoney, Stepfamilies in the Law, supra note 6, at 919-24.
22. Id.
23. This Note uses the terms "legitimate" or "valid" to describe those intestacy claims
brought by a stepchild whose relationship with a stepparent was so meaningful that the
stepchild should be considered the natural object of the stepparent's bounty. For a discus-
sion of presumptions and the types of extrinsic evidence that might assist a court in deter-
mining legitimacy, see infra Part III.
24. CAL. PROB. CODE § 6454 (Deering Supp. 1995). This section reads in its entirety:
For the purpose of determining intestate succession by a person or the per-
son's issue from or through a foster parent or stepparent, the relationship of par-
ent and child exists between that person and the person's foster parent or
stepparent if both of the following requirements are satisfied:
[Vol. 47
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provision of the statute differently,25 causing a split which the Califor-
nia Supreme Court has not yet resolved.26 The dispute revolves
around section 6454's requirement that the stepchild show that the
stepparent would have adopted the stepchild but for a legal barrier.
The court in Estate of Stevenson27 accepted a stepchild intestacy claim
by holding that this requirement was satisfied so long as a legal barrier
existed at the time of the attempted adoption.2 In Estate of Cleve-
land,2 9 on the other hand, the court held that the legal barrier had to
exist throughout the lifetime of the decedent in order for the stepchild
to inherit.30 With no similar provision in other states and no guidance
from California's highest court, probate courts are virtually free to
read the statute as narrowly or as broadly as they wish.31 Therefore,
despite California's legislative recognition that meaningful familial re-
lationships are often formed between a stepparent and stepchild, pro-
bate courts may still ignore these relationships when determining
estate distribution by viewing section 6454 from the perspective of
traditional intestacy schemes.
(a) The relationship began during the person's minority and continued
throughout the joint lifetimes of the person and the person's foster parent or
stepparent.
(b) It is established by clear and convincing evidence that the foster parent
or stepparent would have adopted the person but for a legal barrier.
Id. California also allows a stepchild to inherit if the decedent leaves no spouse, issue,
parents or issue of parents, or grandparents or issue of grandparents. CAL. PROB. CODE
§ 6402(e) (Deering 1991). Additionally, in order that property be returned to the family of
the original donor, California provides for special distribution of "the portion of the dece-
dent's estate attributable to decedent's predeceased spouse." CAL. PROB. CODE
§ 6402.5(a) (Deering 1991). Although distribution under this provision is complex and oc-
curs in only limited circumstances, this statute does provide for de facto intestate succes-
sion by stepchildren.
25. The two cases are Estate of Stevenson, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d 250 (Ct. App. 1992), and
Estate of Cleveland, 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d 590 (Ct. App. 1993), review denied 1993 Cal. LEXIS
6355 (Cal. 1993). The provision causing the split is the requirement that the stepchild
would have been adopted "but for a legal barrier." CAL. PROB. CODE § 6454(b). For dis-
cussion of the two cases, see infra Part II B.
26. Although the California Supreme Court declined its first opportunity to resolve
the split, In re Estate of Cleveland, 1993 Cal. LEXIS 6355 (1993), the Court has recently
granted review in another case that interpreted the same provision of section 6454 that was
at issue in Stevenson and Cleveland. Estate of Smith, 42 Cal. Rptr. 2d 42 (Ct. App. 1995),
review granted 902 P.2d 1296 (Cal. 1995). The court of appeals in Smith examined the
contrasting interpretations in Stevenson and Cleveland and determined that the Stevenson
opinion more correctly construed the intent behind the statute. 42 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 47.
27. 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d 250.
28. Id. at 258.
29. 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d 590.
30. Id. at 596-600.
31. It should be noted that guidance from the California Supreme Court may soon be
forthcoming after the Court's decision to review Smith. See supra note 26.
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This Note examines California Probate Code section 6454 and its
disparate treatment in the California courts of appeal to determine
how the intestacy needs and wishes of the growing stepfamily popula-
tion might be better addressed. The issue is simply framed: Which in-
terpretation of section 6454 is more aptly attuned to the needs of
modem probate? Should probate courts and the legislature, like the
Cleveland court, continue to regard stepchild intestacy claims from the
traditional perspective, thus denying such claims in all but exceptional
cases? Or should Stevenson's more liberal treatment of stepchild intes-
tacy claims serve as a model for a probate system that strives to ac-
count for the diversity in modern family structures? While the law
certainly could not have responded immediately to the dramatic shifts
in family structure outlined above, continued treatment of stepfami-
lies as a social anomaly is absurd as much as it is unfair. To rectify this
unfair treatment, this Note argues that courts should construe section
6454 in a way that will ensure acceptance of stepchild intestacy claims
in those situations in which the probate court determines that a legiti-
mate parent-child relationship existed between the stepparent and the
stepchild. In addition, to the extent that section 6454 itself imposes
unfair burdens on the ability of stepchildren to legitimately claim in-
testate shares, the legislature should amend the statute to allow pro-
bate courts the latitude necessary to ascertain the existence of
legitimate parent-child relationships.
In order to adequately frame the debate, Part I summarizes the
law's historical treatment of stepfamilies, with special consideration of
California's treatment before the passage of section 6454. Part II ana-
lyzes the Stevenson and Cleveland decisions, highlighting their con-
trasts and noting how section 6454 still places irrational burdens on
legitimate stepchild intestacy claims. Part III argues that, for policy
reasons, the legislature needs to amend section 6454 to further recog-
nize the meaningful relationships that can develop between a steppar-
ent and a stepchild. Part III also argues that until such a legislative
change, courts must strive for equitable treatment of stepchildren by
construing section 6454 as liberally as possible.
I. Historical Treatment of Stepchildren in the Law of
Intestate Succession
A. Traditional and Modem Treatment in Jurisdictions Other than
California
Rights to intestate succession are almost wholly statutory.3 2
American intestacy statutes are largely based on the common law ca-
32. See RrrciE, supra note 3, at 6 (defining intestate succession as the process by
which "property passes ... to those relatives who are named in a state statute"); Lovas,
[Vol. 47
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nons of descent, 33 which governed the succession of real property, and
the English Statute of Distribution,34 which governed the succession
of personalty.3 5 Under both of these intestacy schemes, inheritance
was strictly limited to blood relatives.3 6 American jurisdictions have
softened this strict limitation only slightly by permitting intestate suc-
cession by the decedent's surviving spouse and adopted children,37
often by including the relationship between a decedent and an
adopted child in the statutory definition of "parent-child
relationship." 38
Stepchildren, on the other hand, have traditionally been ignored
by modern intestacy statutes. As one early commentator noted,
It is popularly believed that stepchildren are often shamefully ne-
glected. They have been practically forgotten, so far as general legis-
lation is concerned. The stepchild is therefore generally left to the
tender mercies of the common law, whose fundamental pronounce-
ment is that the mere relationship of stepparent and stepchild con-
fers no rights and imposes no duties.... No right of inheritance is
conferred unless the stepchild is adopted.
39
The most striking aspect of this commentary on "traditional"
treatment of stepchildren is that it serves equally well to describe the
"modern" treatment. Professor Mahoney noted that "under modern
intestacy laws, the decedent's 'children' have priority over most other
surviving relatives. The term 'children' has never been defined
broadly to include stepchildren in this context. Similarly, stepparents
have never been included in the category of 'parents." '4° And when
intestacy statutes do acknowledge stepchildren, they often do so only
supra note 11, at 354 (noting that "[iln the absence of a will... and sometimes in spite of a
will, probate codes dictate who gets what").
33. BL. sroNE, supra note 1, at *208-234.
34. 22 & 23 Car. 2 ch. 10 (1670) (Eng.) (repealed 1925).
35. Fellows, supra note 3, at 322; Rrrcim, supra note 3, at 10.
36. See Mahoney, Stepfamilies in the Law, supra note 6, at 919-20 (noting that
"[h]istorically, the law of intestate succession has focused rigidly on blood relationships....
Steprelatives who are not related by blood have not fared well in this system"). The canons
of descent provided that "inheritances shall lineally descend to the issue" of the decedent
or to "the next collateral kinsman of the whole blood." BLASoNE, supra note 1, at *208,
224 (emphasis in original). The Statute of Distribution was slightly more liberal, providing
for collateral inheritance among "every of the next of kindred of the intestate," thus includ-
ing half-blood inheritance. 22 & 23 Car. 2 ch. 10 s. 3 (emphasis added).
37. Mahoney, Stepfamilies in the Law, supra note 6, at 919; see also IV CHESTER G.
VERNIER, AMERICAN FAMILY LAWS § 262 at 408-409 (1936) (noting that by 1936 all Amer-
ican jurisdictions except for Mississippi conferred inheritance rights on adopted children).
38. E.g., CAL_ PROB. CODE § 6450 (Deering Supp. 1995). For a summary of the debate
over whether adoption severs the parent-child relationship between the adopted child and
that child's natural parents, see RrrcmE, supra note 3, at 107-08, and Lovas, supra note 11,
at 367-71.
39. VERNIER, supra note 37, § 268 at 485.
40. Mahoney, Stepfamilies in the Law, supra note 6, at 920.
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in order to specifically except the stepparent-stepchild relationship
from the statutory definition of "parent-child relationship."'4'
Other jurisdictions acknowledge stepchildren by allowing them to
inherit when the property would otherwise escheat.42 One such statute
was at issue in In re Estate of Smith.43 In Smith, the decedent's will left
a dollar to each of five named "children," four of whom were actually
stepchildren. 44 Because the residual beneficiary had predeceased the
decedent, virtually the entire estate passed through intestate succes-
sion.45 The court ignored the clear indication that the decedent wished
the stepchildren to be treated as his "children" for distribution pur-
poses, instead emphasizing that the applicable statute "provid[ed] for
inheritance from a stepparent in order to avoid escheat of the prop-
erty to the state. The right of a stepchild to inherit from a stepparent is
limited to the circumstances outlined therein. '46
Stepchildren have also sought to establish intestacy claims under
statutes which eliminate the distinction between half-blood and whole
blood kindred. In In re Estate of Humphrey,47 the decedent left no
legal children but did leave a stepdaughter.48 The stepdaughter was
eight years old at the time of her mother's marriage to the decedent,
and was raised and cared for in her stepfather's and mother's house-
hold.49 The federal district court for the District of Columbia held
valid the stepdaughter's intestacy claim under a statute that elimi-
nated half-blood/whole blood distinctions for purposes of intestate
succession.50 In reaching its decision, the court noted "the modem
public policy of Congress to accord to stepchildren the same rights as
to natural children."''s The court failed to acknowledge, however, that
this modern public policy had yet to manifest itself in intestacy stat-
utes, and that the statute at issue did not eliminate distinctions be-
tween collateral relatives (whether of half or whole blood) and
steprelatives. On appeal, the D.C. Circuit summarily reversed the Dis-
trict Court's decision.5 2
41. E.g., ALASKA STAT. § 13.06.050(3) (1994) (excluding from the definition of child
"any person who is only a stepchild").
42. E.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 11.04.095 (West 1987).
43. 299 P.2d 550 (Wash. 1956).
44. Id. at 551.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 552.
47. 254 F. Supp.'33 (D.D.C. 1966), rev'd, Humphrey v. Tolson, 384 F.2d 987 (D.C. Cir.
1966).
48. Id. at 33.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 35.
51. Id.
52. Humphrey v. Tolson, 384 F.2d 987 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
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Smith and Humphrey are perfect illustrations of how probate
courts are handcuffed by modem intestacy statutes even when the
facts indicate that the stepchild's intestacy claim is legitimate. The
laws of intestate succession simply fail to acknowledge that meaning-
ful parent-child relationships can ever form between a stepparent and
stepchild, when in fact such relationships are by no means uncommon.
Because of the statutory nature of the law of intestate succession,
judges are faced with the choice of either rejecting valid claims or ig-
noring statutory language in order to achieve just results.5 3
B. Traditional Treatment of Stepchildren in California
Prior to the general revision of the California Probate Code that
took effect on January 1, 1985, stepchildren had little hope of inherit-
ing through intestate succession in California. In the leading case of
Estate of Lima,5 4 the decedent left one biological child and three
stepchildren, who were the biological children of her predeceased hus-
band.55 The intestate estate's principal asset was real property that the
decedent's husband (the stepchildren's biological father) had trans-
ferred to the decedent six years before his death and eleven years
before the death of the decedent.5 6 The stepchildren claimed equal
shares in the real property under former Probate Code section 229,
which provided: "If the decedent leaves neither spouse nor issue, and
the estate or any portion thereof was separate property of a previously
deceased spouse, and came from such spouse by gift... such property
goes in equal shares to the children of the deceased spouse .... -157 The
court correctly noted, however, that section 229 only applied where
the decedent left no issue, and here the decedent was survived by a
biological child.58 Accordingly, the court applied former Probate
Code section 222, which provided: "If the decedent leaves no surviv-
ing spouse, but leaves issue, the whole estate goes to such issue. .. .. 59
The court was left with no choice but to distribute the entire estate to
the surviving biological daughter, because "[s]tepchildren simply have
53. Non-blood, unadopted children have occasionally established intestacy claims
under the judicial doctrine of equitable adoption, which bases the relationship on a con-
tract to adopt. Mahoney, Stepfamilies in the Law, supra note 6, at 925-26. This doctrine has
proven to be an inadequate tool for stepchildren: "When the alleged adoptor is the child's
stepparent the courts almost invariably find the proof insufficient on the grounds that the
conduct of the parties was as consistent with a normal stepparent-stepchild relationship as
it was with a contract to adopt." Jan Ellen Rein, Relatives by Blood, Adoption and Associa-
tion: Who Should Get What and Why, 37 VAND. L. REv. 711, 781-82 (1984).
54. 37 Cal. Rptr. 404 (Ct. App. 1964).
55. Id. at 397.
56. Id.
57. Id at 405 n.l.
58. Id at 405.
59. Id.
November 1995]
not been embraced within the meaning of the word 'issue' as used in
Probate Code section 222."60 In so doing, the court acknowledged that
such a result was hardly desirable:
Although it may appear unjust that stepchildren, under facts here
present, may not share in the estate of their stepparent who has left
issue, especially when the assets of the estate were at one time the
property of the natural parent of the stepchildren, the language of
the code section, the case law and the historical status of stepchil-
dren permit no other interpretation.... [T]he status of stepchildren
has not been disturbed, and we must take the law as we find it.6 1
The facts of Estate of Davis62 are similar. Philip and Alice, each of
whom had children from a previous marriage, were married for 32
years.63 When Alice died without a will, her entire estate passed to her
husband.64 When he died four months later, Alice's children from the
previous marriage claimed that they were entitled to a share of the
estate on the theory of equitable adoption. 65 The court dismissed the
equitable adoption claim and ruled instead that succession was gov-
erned by the former section 222, under which "[u]nadopted children
are not 'issue' entitled to take. '66
In Steed v. Imperial Airlines,67 the California Supreme Court con-
firmed that stepchildren had no right to intestate succession. In that
case the decedent's stepdaughter Elizabeth brought an action for the
wrongful death of her stepfather.68 The stepfather had held Elizabeth
out to world as his daughter, fully supporting her and encouraging her
to use his surname, and the parties stipulated that he had treated the
stepdaughter in exactly the same manner as he had his natural daugh-
ter.69 Under the applicable wrongful death statute, however, rights of
action were limited to those who were "heirs" of the deceased.70 Cit-
ing Lima, the Court rejected the stepdaughter's claim, noting that
"[t]here is . . . no provision for inheritance by dependent
stepchildren. ' 71
60. Id.
61. Id. (citations omitted).
62. 165 Cal. Rptr. 543 (Ct. App. 1980).
63. Id. at 544.
64. Id.
65. Id. The doctrine of equitable adoption allows non-legal children to inherit based
on the promise or contract of the parent to adopt the child. Stepchildren traditionally are
unable to prove the existence of such a contract. See supra note 53.
66. 165 Cal. Rptr. at 544.
67. 524 P.2d 801 (Cal. 1974), cert. dismissed, 420 U.S. 916 (1975).
68. Id. at 802.
69. Id. at 802-03 n.2.
70. Id. at 803.
71. Id.
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Justice Burke, joined by Justices Tobriner and Mosk, dissented.
Noting that Elizabeth's injury was identical to her half-sister, who was
allowed to recover under the wrongful death statute, the dissent ar-
gued that "it would be wholly inequitable to deny recovery to Eliza-
beth."72 Although they limited their argument to actions for wrongful
death, the dissenters found "no rational reason for drawing a distinc-
tion between dependent stepchildren . . . and other dependent
children." 7
3
Lima, Davis, and Steed adequately illustrate California's tradi-
tionally inflexible and inequitable treatment of stepchildren. They also
illustrate the inability of courts to contravene long-standing and out-
of-date succession laws in order to acknowledge stepchild intestacy
claims even when they are clearly legitimate. The following Part dis-
cusses the California Legislature's response to these problems-Pro-
bate Code section 6454.
II. California Probate Code Section 6454
A. First Impressions-Claffey and Lind
In 1983 the California Legislature passed Assembly Bill 25, which
effected a wholesale revision of a large part of the California Probate
Code.74 Included in these changes was the addition of section 6408,
which provided for determination of the existence of a parent-child
relationship for purposes of intestate succession.75 As originally en-
acted, the statute provided that a relationship between a stepparent
and stepchild had
the same effect as if it were an adoptive relationship if (i) the rela-
tionship began during the person's minority and continued through-
out the parties' joint lifetimes and (ii) it is established by clear and
convincing evidence that the foster parent or stepparent would have
adopted the person but for a legal barrier.76
72. Id. at 811 (Burke, J., dissenting).
73. Id. at 811-12 (Burke, J., dissenting).
74. For a summary of changes made by the bill, see C~ALtomiA LEGISLATURE, 1983
SUMMARY DIGEST 284-87 (1983).
75. Id.
76. 1983 Cal. A.B. 25, 1983-84 Sess., § 6408(a)(2) (1983). The statute was proposed by
the Law Revision Commission, which commented that the provision "is new and is not
found in the Uniform Probate Code. This sentence applies, for example, where a foster
child or stepchild is not adopted because a parent of the child refuses to consent to the
adoption." 17 CAL. LAW REV. Comm. REP, S. REP. AB 25, at 882 (1983). This language is
repeated in the Law Revision Commission's Comments to the subsequent amendments
and recodification of section 6408, but it is clear that other legal barriers may exist. For
example, a child over the age of 12 must consent to being adopted. CA.. FAM. CODE
§ 8602 (West 1994). It is not hard to imagine such a child, still feeling attachment to a
deceased or non-custodial biological parent, refusing to consent when first confronted with
the idea of stepparent adoption. Nor is it hard to imagine that a legitimate familial relation-
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The legislature subsequently amended the statute, dropping the
"adoptive relationship" language and instead providing that "[f]or the
purpose of determining intestate succession by a person or his or her
descendants from or through a foster parent or stepparent, the rela-
tionship of parent and child exists between that person and his or her
foster parent or stepparent" if the requirements are met.77 In 1993, the
statute was recodified (with technical changes) as section 6454.
In its present form, section 6454 provides five requirements that
must be met in order for the stepchild to take through intestate suc-
cession. First, a stepparent-stepchild relationship must exist. Second,
the relationship must have formed during the child's minority. Third,
the relationship must have continued throughout the lifetimes of both
the stepchild and the stepparent. Fourth, clear and convincing evi-
dence must show that the stepparent would have adopted the
stepchild. Finally, clear and convincing evidence must also prove that
the adoption would have taken place but for a legal barrier.
78
The court of appeal first construed section 645479 in Estate of
Claffey.80 The stepchildren of Bessie Claffey claimed that the trial
judge had improperly instructed the jury that the statute required the
existence of a "family relationship" rather than "merely" a "stepchild/
stepparent relationship," which would arise as soon as the natural par-
ent and the stepparent were married, whether or not the stepparent
ship may eventually develop between that child and the stepparent. Another example of a
legal barrier is found in Estate of Lind, 257 Cal. Rptr. 853 (Ct. App. 1989), in which the
attempted adoption of an adult failed because California law at the time prohibited adult
adoptions. Id. at 859.
77. CAL. PROB. CODE § 6408(e) (West 1991) (repealed 1993). The change has two
effects. First, the claiming stepchild can still inherit from the natural parents (and vice
versa). Adoption, on the other hand, severs the child's right to inherit from his or her
biological parent unless certain requirements are met. CAL. PROB. CODE § 6451 (Deering
Supp. 1995). Such an effect is not desirable in stepfamily situations, because the stepchild
may develop a meaningful relationship with the stepparent while maintaining a traditional
parent-child relationship with the natural parents. The second effect is that stepparents
cannot inherit under the statute, which "applies only to inheritance by the foster child or
stepchild or the child's issue 'from' or 'through' a foster parent or stepparent, not to inheri-
tance 'by' a foster parent or stepparent." 20 CAL. LAW REV. COMM. REPORTS at 1470
(1990). This Comment does not explain why a stepparent should not be permitted to in-
herit from a stepchild. If a legitimate parent-child relationship is established, it makes little
sense to allow inheritance within that relationship to flow in one direction and not the
other.
78. CAL. PROB. CODE § 6454.
79. At the time of Claffey, Lind, Stevenson, and Cleveland, section 6454 was codified
as part of section 6408. Because the requirements of section 6454 are identical to those in
the former section 6408, the remainder of this Note refers to both the old and the new
codifications as section 6454. See supra notes 74-77 and accompanying text for a discussion
of the legislative history.
80. 257 Cal. Rptr. 197 (Ct. App. 1989).
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even knew the children or was allowed to see them.81 The court prop-
erly rejected this claim, agreeing instead with the trial court's determi-
nation that the statute contemplated a relationship "'like that of' a
natural parent and child in the sense of a 'family' relationship. '8 2 The
stepchildren apparently had little to show that their relationship with
Bessie was in any way a "family relationship," as the only time they
had spent in her home and under her care followed the tonsillectomies
that Bessie (who was a doctor) had performed.8 3 Consequently, the
jury found that no family relationship existed, and the court of appeal
found no reason to disturb this result.84
The Claffey case is important because it showed that stepchildren
could not use the new statute to support intestacy claims that were not
legitimate. Under the Claffey court's interpretation, stepchildren bear
the burden of proving more than a mere stepparent-stepchild relation-
ship. Instead, stepchildren must prove, by a preponderance of evi-
dence, the existence of a legitimate parent-child relationship. 85 If
claiming stepchildren cannot meet this threshhold requirement, a
court need not even consider the statute's other requirements, i.e.,
that the relation began during the child's minority, continued through-
out the lifetime of both parties, and that the child would have been
adopted but for a legal barrier.86
The court's interpretation is in accord with the premise of this
Note: legitimate family relationships do not always form between
stepparents and stepchildren, but when they do, intestate succession
rights should form with the relationship. One commentary argues that
the Claffey interpretation supplants an ambiguous term ("relation-
ship") with an equally ambiguous phrase ("family relationship"). 87 To
be sure, "family relationship" is not easily defined and can be manipu-
lated, especially in light of the reality of abusive and/or dysfunctional
family relationships. This ambiguity is not fatal-it only means that
claimants must prove that their relationship with their stepparent was.
such that the stepparent would have expected the stepchild to be
treated as a natural child for the purposes of intestate succession. 88 As
81. Id. at 199.
82. Id. at 198.
83. Id at 199 n.3.
84. Id. at 200.
85. Id.
86. The Claffey court noted that even if it had not read a "family relationship" re-
quirement into the statute, the stepchildren would have lost because they failed to con-
vince the jury by clear and convincing evidence that Bessie would have adopted them but
for a legal barrier. Id at 200 n.6.
87. Robin Meadow & Jeffrey M. Loeb, Heirs Unapparent: An Anomalous Rule of
Intestate Succession Triggers a Standoff in the Courts of Appea4 L.A. LAWYER June 1994 at
34, 38-39.
88. For the factors that may help prove such a claim, see infra Part III.
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the Claffey court said, "[D]istribution of the estate of one dying with-
out a will to his or her unadopted stepchild rather than to heirs claim-
ing by blood relationship is not automatic and must be based on a
review of each situation. '89 The jury in Claffey made its review of the
situation and determined that a family relationship did not exist.90
The next court to construe section 6454 also had little trouble in
determining whether a legitimate relationship had developed. In Es-
tate of Lind,91 claimant Warren Haughey appealed the probate court's
determination that he lacked standing to contest his foster sister's
will.92 The central issue on appeal was whether Warren had pled suffi-
cient facts to allege that he had met section 6454's requirement that
his foster parents93 would have adopted him but for a legal barrier.94
Warren had lived with his foster parents from shortly after his birth
until he was twenty-two years old, and the foster parents had treated
him as their natural child throughout their lifetimes. Based on these
facts the court noted that the Claffey-imposed "family relationship"
requirement 95 had been met.96 Warren had produced letters written
by his foster parents which indicated that adoption papers had been
filed and which made references to Warren as their adopted son.97
From this evidence, the court held that "the probate court could infer,
at least, an attempt or attempts at adoption, which could be taken by
the court as showing the Haugheys 'would have adopted' [Warren]. ' 98
This holding shows a softening of the statutory "would have
adopted" requirement. Showing by clear and convincing evidence that
the parents' state of mind was such that they "would have adopted" is
difficult in any context. In Lind it was particularly difficult because
more than forty years had passed between the attempted adoption
and the will contest. Therefore, circumstantial evidence that tends to
89. 257 Cal. Rptr. at 200.
90. Id.
91. 257 Cal. Rptr. 853 (Ct. App. 1989).
92. Id. at 854.
93. The statute imposes the same requirements on claiming foster children as are im-
posed on claiming stepchildren. CAL. PROB. CODE § 6454.
94. 257 Cal. Rptr. at 857. The facts and issues of the case are somewhat confusing. The
claimant was the foster child of the decedent's parents. In order to have standing to con-
test, he had to show that he was an "interested person," i.e., that he would be entitled to a
share if any portion of the estate should pass through intestacy. Id. at 856. The decedent
had died a widow without issue and was predeceased by her parents, in which case the
Probate Code calls for distribution to the issue of the decedent's parents. CAL. PROB.
CODE § 6402(c) (Deering 1991). In order to have standing to contest, therefore, the claim-
ant needed to show a section 6454 parent-child relationship that would allow him to claim
an intestate share of the decedent's estate through his foster parents. 257 Cal. Rptr. at 856.
95. See supra notes 79-90 and accompanying text.
96. 257 Cal. Rptr. at 857.
97. Id. at 857-58.
98. Id. at 858.
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 47
INTESTATE SUCCESSION FOR STEPCHILDREN
show the parents' state of mind is often the best and possibly the only
way for a foster or stepchild to satisfy this statutory requirement. The
Lind court recognized this in holding that a court may infer this state
of mind when the parent has attempted to adopt the child.99 In dicta,
the court noted that courts could infer from an attempted adoption
that the parents would have completed the adoption but for a legal
barrier, provided that the claiming child can show that a definite legal
barrier existed. 100 The court stated that a probate court can infer that
the attempted adoption failed because of a legal barrier, "absent evi-
dence the attempt was aborted for nonlegal [sic] reasons (such as a
change of heart, lack of funds, or mere lethargy)."'uo In other words,
once a claiming stepchild (or foster child) establishes the existence of
an attempted adoption and a legal barrier, the burden switches to the
opposing party to show the adoption failed for a non-legal reason.
In summary, these first attempts to construe section 6454 pro-
duced several common sense results. First, the relationship contem-
plated by the statute is not simply any relationship that begins as soon
as the stepparent has married the natural parent. Rather, the stepchild
has the burden of proving that the relationship with the stepparent
was such that the stepparent would have wished that the stepchild be
treated as a natural child for intestate succession purposes.' °2 Second,
probate courts can infer that the stepparents "would have adopted"
the stepchild from evidence of an attempted adoption. 0 3 Finally,
where the claiming stepchild can show an attempted adoption and a
definite legal barrier, the burden switches to the opposing party to
prove that the adoption failed for reasons other than the legal bar-
rier.104 The legal barrier requirement, however, is more ambiguous
than it first appears. The following Part reveals that two California
courts of appeal have reached diametrically opposed conclusions in
determining whether the legal barrier must exist throughout the joint
lifetimes of the parties.
B. A Split in the Courts of Appeal-Stevenson and Cleveland
Estate of Stevenson'0 5 required interpretation of both the "contin-
uous relationship" and the "but for a legal barrier" requirements of
99. Id.
100. Id. at 859. Here, the attempted adoption took place after the claimant turned
twenty-two. His age constituted a legal barrier because California law at the time prohib-
ited adult adoptions. Id.
101. Id.
102. Claffey, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 198-200.
103. Lind 257 Cal. Rptr. at 858.
104. hM at 859.
105. 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d 250 (1992).
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section 6454.106 The claiming stepchildren, born in 1950 and 1951,
lived with the decedent (their stepmother) from 1953 or 1954 until
approximately 1959, when the decedent and the natural father sepa-
rated.107 The couple reunited seven years later, and remained together
as a couple until the father's death in 1983.108 The stepchildren, who
had remained with the decedent when their father went to serve in the
Vietnam War, did not know that the decedent was not their natural
mother until around the time of the father's death. Their relationship
with the decedent continued until the decedent's death in 1990.109
The court first determined that the seven year separation be-
tween the natural father and the stepmother did not preclude satisfac-
tion of the "continuous relationship" requirement. 110 Instead, the
court agreed with Claffey's reasoning that the statute contemplated a
"family relationship" and that the probate court should review each
situation in order to determine whether that family relationship ex-
isted."' The Stevenson court emphasized that no particular formula
exists for making this determination: "Courts should consider the to-
tality of the circumstances to determine whether the relationship satis-
fies the statutory criteria. If the totality of the circumstances suggests a
continuing family relationship, then this aspect of section [6454] is
met.""12 The Stevenson court held that the totality of the circum-
stances indicated a continuous relationship between the decedent and
the stepchildren. The court based its decision mainly on the length of
the relationship and evidence that the stepmother regarded the claim-
106. The court also reviewed the evidence in the probate court to determine whether it
was sufficient for that court to find that the stepparent "would have adopted." Id. at 255-
56. Like the Lind court before it, the Stevenson court held that circumstantial evidence of
the stepparent's intent to adopt could be sufficient to meet this requirement. Id. For a
discussion of Lind, see supra notes 91-101 and accompanying text.
107. 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 252.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 254-55. The court provided three reasons why a "continuous relationship"
did not require "continuous cohabitation." First, the court noted that the statute makes no
reference to continuous cohabitation. Id. at 253-54. Second, "there are good reasons why a
stepparent's separation from the natural parent should not automatically prevent the child
from inheriting from the stepparent," such as cases in which the separation was brief, the
relationship continued to flourish during the separation, or the length of time spent to-
gether outweighed the fact that the relationship was temporarily interrupted. Id. at 254. As
an example, the court pointed out that the relationship at issue had lasted more than thirty-
five years. Id. Third, section 6454 refers "to a relationship which continues 'throughout the
parties joint lifetime.' This indicates that the relationship should continue past the child's
minority," when most children have left the family home. Id.
111. Id. at 254-55.
112. Id. at 255.
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ants as her natural children and the children regarded the decedent as
their natural mother.113
One commentary criticizes Stevenson's "totality of the circum-
stances" test because California residents will not know "what might
be considered the 'totality of circumstances' as of a yet unknown and
unknowable date of death.' 1 4 This argument ignores the fact that in-
testate succession statutes are designed not for those who concoct a
plan to distribute their estate, but for instances when the decedent has
failed to plan. It is hard to imagine a situation where a person engaged
in estate planning would worry about satisfying the section 6454 re-
quirements when their donative intent could be simply and specifically
spelled out in a will. It is easier to imagine the situation where the
decedent has maintained a continuous family relationship with a
stepchild, not out of desire to satisfy section 6454, but because the
stepparent had meaningful parental feelings for the child and wished
to treat the stepchild as his or her natural child. Stevenson's "totality
of the circumstances" test merely directs the finder of fact to examine
the evidence and to decide whether the decedent would have wanted
the stepchild to take a natural child's share of the intestate estate. The
argument that this approach causes confusion among those planning
their estates fails to acknowledge that section 6454 is an intestacy stat-
ute, not an estate planning device.1 15
The second issue in Stevenson concerned the "but for a legal bar-
rier" requirement. 1 6 The natural mother's refusal to consent consti-
tuted the legal barrier to the adoption. 1 7 That legal barrier
disappeared upon the child's reaching the age of majority because the
consent of the natural parent was no longer required. 1 8 The dece-
dent's natural children argued that the statutory requirement was not
met because the legal barrier was non-existent after the stepchildren
turned eighteen.119 The court disagreed, holding that "[s]o long as the
circumstances demonstrate that the parent wanted to adopt the child
113. Id.
114. Meadow & Loeb, supra note 87, at 39-40.
115. Meadow and Loeb also express the concern that under Stevenson, "how can any-
one know for certain how to end an otherwise continuous relationship if separation alone
may not be sufficient?" Id. at 40. This concern seems to be based on the assumption that
people who end relationships normally do so by taking specific actions so that they can
later convince courts that the relationship did indeed end at that time. This assumption is
unrealistic. Finders of fact, whether judge or jury, should just as easily be able to tell if a
relationship has ended, based on an examination of the totality of circumstances surround-
ing that relationship.
116. 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 256-58.
117. Id. at 257.
118. Id.
119. Id. The decedent's natural children also claimed that the consent of the stepchild's
natural mother was not necessary because the natural mother had abandoned the
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but was prevented by a legal barrier, then we believe the statutory
requirements are met.... It is not necessary that the legal barrier exist
until the time the stepparent dies."'1 20
The court in Estate of Cleveland'2' reached a dramatically differ-
ent result in its interpretation of the "but for a legal barrier" require-
ment. In this case the claiming stepchild and his natural mother had
lived with the decedent when the stepchild was between the ages of
twelve and twenty-four. 22 The stepchild argued that the "but for a
legal barrier" was met because the decedent had once asked the
mother for permission to adopt, but the mother had refused. 2 3 The
decedent, however, made no attempt to adopt the stepchild during the
sixteen years that lapsed between the claimant's eighteenth birthday
and the decedent's death. 2 4 Explicitly rejecting the Stevenson court's
interpretation of the statute, the court denied the claimant's appeal
from summary judgment. The court held that "[t]he term 'but for' as
found in section [6454] is plain and unequivocal in its meaning ....
The legal impediment must be the 'sine qua non' of the failure to
adopt. The test is whether the adoption would have occurred 'but for'
the legal impediment."' 2 5 Applying this holding to the facts of the
case, the court concluded that "decedent's failure to adopt appellant
was not caused by the legal impediment of appellant's mother's re-
fusal to consent to the adoption during appellant's minority.' 26
Despite the obvious split formed by the Cleveland court's hold-
ing, the California Supreme Court declined to review the decision.'2 7
Probate courts in California, therefore, currently have little guidance
as to whether they should follow Stevenson or Cleveland when faced
with a "but for a legal barrier" problem. 2 8 The final Part of this Note
stepchild. Id. at 256. The court rejected this argument because the natural children had
failed to raise the issue at the trial level. Id. at 256-57.
120. Id. at 257.
121. 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d 590 (Ct. App. 1993).
122. Id. at 593.
123. Id. The mother refused because "[s]he feared it would damage her relationship
with [the child], wanted [the child] to retain her name, and felt she could financially sup-
port him." Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 597 (citation omitted).
126. Id. at 600.
127. In re Estate of Cleveland, 1993 Cal. LEXIS 6355 (1993).
128. Since the split occurred, one other case has examined the "but for a legal barrier"
requirement. Estate of Smith, 42 Cal. Rptr. 2d 42 (Ct. App. 1995). The court acknowledged
the rift caused by Stevenson and Cleveland before deciding to follow Stevenson as more
closely effectuating the legislative intent. Id. at 47-48. The California Supreme Court
granted review of this decision, 902 P.2d 1296 (Cal. 1995), meaning that probate and appel-
late courts may soon have explicit guidance regarding "but for a legal barrier" problems.
However, the Supreme Court's resolution of the "but for a legal barrier" dilemma would
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discusses how courts, and ultimately the legislature, should resolve
this dilemma.
M. Guidance and Proposals Regarding the Future of
Intestate Succession for Stepchildren in California
A. Guidance for the Courts
Resolution of the split caused by the disparate holdings in Steven-
son and Cleveland is ultimately for the legislature or the California
Supreme Court. Until such resolution, however, California probate
and intermediate appellate courts must apply the statute in its present
form and with its present interpretations. In holding that the "but for
a legal barrier" requirement is met if the barrier existed at the time of
the attempted adoption, the Stevenson court first noted that "once the
child reaches adulthood, the parties may decide that adopting the
child is not so important." 129 The court did not explain why adult
adoption may be "not so important," and it failed to acknowledge that
the diminishing importance of adoption may just as easily show that
the importance of the relationship is declining in the minds of the par-
ties-a point emphasized in Cleveland.130 As the Cleveland court
noted, "[t]here are many reasons for formalizing a parent-child rela-
tionship besides the care and protection of a minor. Adoption impli-
cates estate tax planning... ; construction of insurance policies... ;
right to recover for wrongful death; right to sue or be sued for negli-
gence; dependency matters ... ; and custody/visitation issues."'131 In
short, the "not so important" rationale supplies little support for the
Stevenson court's holding.132
The Stevenson court also attempted to support its conclusion by
arguing that a different interpretation would subvert legislative intent
by precluding application of section 6454 to adult stepchildren:
Given that the legal barrier is usually the natural parent's refusal to
consent to the adoption, it would not make sense to require that the
legal barrier exist until the stepparent dies. If such a requirement
were imposed, then section [6454] would only apply when the step-
son or stepdaughter is a minor.... We doubt that this was the Legis-
lature's intent in enacting section [6454].
135
still not resolve the broader problem of inadequate recognition of stepchilren in modem
intestacy schemes.
129. 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 257.
130. 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 597.
131. Id. at 599.
132. Although the Smith court agreed with the holding of Stevenson, it did not support
its conclusion by arguing that adoption may be "not so important" after the stepchild at-
tains adulthood. 42 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 47-48.
133. 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 257-58.
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The court in this sense is almost right, but not quite. The legislative
history of the statute clearly indicates that the statute is intended to
function in those situations where the natural parent has refused to
consent to the adoption. 134 Other barriers may exist, however, even
after the child has become an adult. For instance, the spouse of the
adopting parent must consent to the adoption, 135 as must the spouse
of the adoptee if the adoptee is married. 136 In addition, as is the case
for the adoption of any person over the age of twelve, the adoptee
must consent.
137
Despite the court's correctness in assuming that the legal barrier
will usually be the refusal of the natural parent to adopt, the court is
incorrect in stating that "section [6454] would never permit an adult to
inherit when the stepparent dies intestate."' 38 As the Cleveland court
notes, there is "nothing in the statutory language which indicates that
the 'but for' language is inapplicable to adults. Nor is there anything in
the legislative history evidencing such an intent."' 39 In short, it ap-
pears that no valid support exists for Stevenson's holding that the legal
barrier need only exist at the time of the attempted adoption.
Despite the impropriety of the Stevenson's holding, probate
courts should not rush to dismiss it in favor of Cleveland, because the
Cleveland opinion also has its faults. Although Cleveland has better
legal support, the policy reasons behind its holding are suspect. Unlike
Stevenson, the Cleveland court did not mention the earlier decision
reading the statute as requiring a "family relationship.' 40 The court
134. See supra note 76.
135. CAL. FAM. CODE § 9301 (Deering 1994). In the stepfamily context, the "spouse of
the adopting parent" is the custodial biological parent of the adoptee. The reasons why a
custodial biological parent would refuse consent in such a situation are probably limited,
but not unthinkable. In Cleveland, for example, the biological mother refused to consent to
an adoption in part because she wanted the child to retain her name. 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
593.
136. CAL. FAM. CODE § 9302 (Deering 1994).
137. CAL. FAM. CODE § 8602. If an adult adoptee's biological parent refuses to con-
sent, the adoptee may, out of respect for that parent's wishes, refuse to consent even
though the adoptee has formed a meaningful relationship with the stepparent and the step-
parent wishes to adopt.
138. 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 258. The Smith court acknowledged that under Cleveland sec-
tion 6454 could still apply to adult stepchildren, but argued that Cleveland suggests that
section 6454 "applies primarily when the child is still a minor, or has only recently reached
the age of majority when the step- or foster parent dies." 42 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 47.
139. 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 598.
140. Estate of Claffey, 257 Cal. Rptr. 197 (Ct. App. 1989). Although one commentary
has criticized Claffey's "family relationship" requirement as being hopelessly vague,
Meadow & Loeb, supra note 87, at 39-40, the most recent case to examine section 6454
endorsed the test as an integral requirement that would help to provide "substantial pro-
tection against . . . marginal claims." Smith, 42 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 48. For a discussion of
Claffey see supra notes 80-90 and accompanying text.
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also neglected to mention that Stevenson had gone even further by
stating that courts should look to the "totality of the circumstances" in
determining whether a family relationship existed and continued
throughout the joint lifetimes of the parties.141 The policy behind
these interpretations is sound: because intestate succession laws are
designed to reflect the estimated wishes of the decedent,142 common
sense dictates that in uncertain circumstances such as a stepfamily sit-
uation the probate court should closely examine the facts in order to
determine whether the steprelatives would be the "natural objects of
each other's bounty.' 43 Despite its liberal holding, then, Stevenson
read into the statute a requirement of close judicial examination in
order to assure that probate courts could ferret out illegitimate
claims.144
Cleveland failed to acknowledge Stevenson's "totality of the cir-
cumstances" safeguard, opining instead that the Stevenson construc-
tion "would invite sham or marginal claims" and would create
"uncertainty as to how the statutory scheme will operate whenever a
stepparent or foster parent relationship has existed."'1 45 In fact, the
Stevenson court would likely have disposed of the claim in Cleveland
without even considering the "but for a legal barrier" requirement,
because the claimant in that case was neither a stepchild146 nor a fos-
ter child.' 47 Before addressing the express statutory requirements, a
court following Stevenson could easily dismiss such a claim as not
demonstrating a family relationship based on the totality of the
circumstances.
At the heart of the dispute between Stevenson and Cleveland are
the different perspectives from which each court viewed the claims
before it. Cleveland viewed the claim from the perspective of tradi-
tional-family based intestacy schemes, emphasizing that
"[s]tepchildren and foster children have historically been excluded
from intestate succession schemes,"' 48 and that its holding would "in-
ject[] a strong dose of certainty into the operation of [section
141. Stevenson, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 255.
142. Mahoney, Stepfamilies in the Law, supra note 6, at 918; Fellows, supra note 3, at
321; Rrrcanm, supra note 3, at 89.
143. Mahoney, Stepfamilies in the Law, supra note 6, at 931.
144. In Claffey, the court denied a claim based solely on its family relationship test
without having to determine whether the express statutory requirements were met. 257
Cal. Rptr. at 200.
145. Cleveland, 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 598-99.
146. The claimant's mother was never married to the decedent. Id. at 593.
147. While for purposes of the summary judgment motion upon which the appeal was
taken the parties stipulated that the claimant was a foster child, id. at 599, the court de-
dined to express any opinion as to whether the claimant was a foster child according to the
statutory definition. Id. at 599 n.14.
148. Id. at 599.
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6454]. ' 149 Stevenson approached the problem with a more contempo-
rary perspective, emphasizing "the fluid state of today's family units
[and] ... the frequency of separation and divorce" in noting that step-
parent-stepchild relationships may continue to flourish even during
periods of separation. 150 Probate courts should follow Stevenson by
adopting this modern perspective. Granted, the Cleveland holding
might better serve the traditional goal of certainty in intestacy laws, 151
but courts and legislatures need to recognize that this certainty was a
function of a societal assumption that the decedent would die a mem-
ber of a traditional family, not a family affected by divorce and remar-
riage. Because American society has lost the luxury of predictable
familial compositions, probate courts should in every instance con-
sider the totality of the circumstances to determine whether a claiming
stepchild should be the natural object of the decedent's bounty. If the
court concludes that no family relationship existed between the dece-
dent and the claimant, the court should dismiss the claim. If the court
is convinced, however, that a legitimate relationship existed, it should
interpret section 6454 in such a way so that justice will be served, and
the claimant may claim the intestate share to which he or she is
entitled.
The question remains as to the contents of the inquiry. As ex-
plained below, the child's age at the time of the stepfamily's formation
and the child's economic dependency on the stepparent are important
factors. Excessive reliance on these factors, however, can have detri-
mental results.15 2 Rather, when determining whether a parent-child
relationship was formed, courts should first look at how the steppar-
ent and stepchild treated each other. If the stepparent has natural chil-
dren, a court should place great emphasis upon how the stepparent
treated the stepchild in comparison to how the stepparent treated the
natural children.'5 3 This comparison will be helpful in determining
149. Id.
150. 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 254.
151. Mark L. Ascher, The 1990 Uniform Probate Code: Older and Better, Or More Like
the Internal Revenue Code?, 77 MiNN. L. Rnv. 639, 641 (1993) (preferring "'living' values,
such as simplicity and certainty, [over] 'dead' values, such as incremental improvements in
effectuating a decedent's intent"); Lomenzo, supra note 6, at 945 (arguing that an intestacy
statute "should be clear, simple, and comprehensible"); Meadow & Loeb, supra note 87, at
35 (stating that predictability is "essential" to intestacy schemes). Some scholars feel that
certainty is better served, however, by laws that recognize the diverse nature of the modem
family. See, e.g., Mahoney, Support and Custody Aspects, supra note 12, at 39 (asserting
that in the face of diverse family life "the law must create new rules to accomplish the goals
of clarity and protection").
152. See infra text accompanying notes 167-72.
153. Cf Mahoney, Support and Custody Aspects, supra note 12, at 39 (arguing that the
legal status of a natural parent-child relationship "serves as a logical model for formulating
a definition of the stepparent-child status").
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whether the relationship continued after the child left the stepparent's
home or after the stepchild's natural parent separated from the step-
parent. On the one hand, while a decline in the stepparent-stepchild
relationship might be expected at this point, such a decline would be
far more telling if the stepparent's declining relationship with the
stepchild were contrasted with continuing close relations with natural
children who had left home. Conversely, consider the situation in
which an adult stepson, while admitting that his relationship with his
stepmother had declined after he left her home, shows that the rela-
tionship between the stepmother and her natural children had com-
pletely disintegrated after they had moved out. In this case the
comparison would enable a court to find the existence of a parent-
child relationship between the stepmother and stepson despite the fact
that the relationship had declined.
Often, however, the stepparent will bring no natural children to
the relationship, eliminating the helpful comparison. In this case, the
finder of fact must determine whether the stepchild should be consid-
ered the natural object of the stepparent's bounty. The kind of evi-
dence that could aid such a determination is virtually unlimited. Did
the child introduce her stepmother as "Mom," and did the mother
introduce her stepchild as "Daughter"? There may be evidence that
the child with a stepmother addressed letters from summer camp to
"Dad and Mom," or even "Dad and Sally," indicating a closer rela-
tionship than if the child addressed the letters just to "Dad." Evidence
might be introduced showing that the stepparent attended every one
of the child's performances, whether they were football games or pi-
ano recitals. On the other hand, perhaps the stepparent never at-
tended a single event. When the stepson was spurned by his high
school love interest, did he tell his stepfather about it? Did the
stepchild ever consult the stepparent for advice on college choices, job
prospects, or financial matters? These types of questions might be rel-
evant to a court's inquiry, and each case will dictate what evidence is
important and what is not. Today's society, with its myriad ways in
which families and family relationships form, compels courts to deter-
mine each case on its own specific facts.
B. Proposal for the Legislature
The California Legislature could resolve the problems identified
in Stevenson and Cleveland by removing all requirements from section
6454 except for one: the claiming stepchild must prove by a prepon-
derance of evidence that a legitimate family relationship existed be-
tween the decedent and the stepchild. There are two reasons why this
proposal has a much better chance of achieving justice than does the
current section 6454.
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First, section 6454 does not define what sort of relationship must
exist between the stepparent and stepchild. Instead, the statute sets
forth certain requirements as an inflexible test by which all steppar-
ent-stepchild relationships must stand or fall. This plain reading,
adopted by Cleveland, means that satisfaction of the statutory require-
ments is sufficient to establish intestate succession rights, despite evi-
dence that might show the relationship was by no means a good one.
Suppose, for example, that for income tax purposes a stepparent
wished to adopt a stepchild with whom he or she had no real relation-
ship. If that stepchild was over the age of twelve, the stepchild could
refuse to consent to the adoption,154 thus imposing a legal barrier. As
long as the stepchild's natural parent remained married to the step-
parent until the stepparent's death (thus satisfying the "continuous re-
lationship" requirement), the stepchild would have a valid claim
under 6454.155
The second and more important reason for revising section 6454
is that in its current form the statute may bar claims even when the
relationship between the stepparent and stepchild was a meaningful
and loving one. The facts of Stevenson are illustrative.' 56 In that case,
the stepchildren had a relationship with their stepmother that began
in their early childhood and lasted until her death almost 40 years
later-some ten years after her husband, who was the stepchildren's
natural father, had died.157 For over twenty years the children be-
lieved the decedent to be their biological mother, and the decedent
was the sole caretaker of the children while their natural father was
stationed in Vietnam.158 Under the facts, it seems just for the stepchil-
dren to share in the decedent's estate. But according to Cleveland's
holding, a section 6454 claim would fail because the legal barrier to
adoption vanished upon the stepchildren reaching the age of
majority.' 59
In addition, even under the Stevenson court's liberal interpreta-
tion, the "but for a legal barrier" requirement can in some instances
defeat an otherwise valid stepchild intestacy claim. In Stevenson, for
example, the natural children argued on appeal that the consent of the
154. CAL. FAM. CODE § 8602.
155. Claffey interpreted the statute as requiring a "family relationship," 257 Cal. Rptr.
at 198-200, and other courts have cited this additional requirement with approval. Smith, 42
Cal. Rptr. 2d at 48; Stevenson, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 254-55. The statute, however, does not
include this common sense requirement and courts outside of the Fourth District are not
obliged to follow Claffey's reading. Cf. Cleveland, 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d 590 (failing to acknowl-
edge Claffey's "family relationship" requirement).
156. 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 251-52.
157. Id. at 252.
158. Id.
159. See Cleveland, 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 597. For analysis of the disparate interpretations
of Stevenson and Cleveland, see supra Part II B.
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claiming stepchildren's natural mother was not required because she
had abandoned the claimants. 16
0
Because the abandonment theory was not raised at trial, the court
declined to consider whether section 6454 applies when "the parties
mistakenly believe that a legal barrier exists.' 6' However, the statute
requires the stepchild to show that the stepparent "would have
adopted the child but for a legal barrier."'162 According to the plain
language of the statute, a mistaken belief would not satisfy this re-
quirement because the adoption would have failed due to mistake, not
because of an actual legal barrier. The claiming stepchildren, there-
fore, might have lost the case if the natural children had claimed at
trial that the consent of the stepchildren's mother was not required
because she had abandoned the children.
The ramifications of the abandonment theory are broad, because
the adopting parents (that is, the custodial natural parent and the
stepparent) may choose to respect the non-custodial parent's refusal
to consent without knowing that the law of abandonment may actually
allow them to adopt without the non-custodial parent's consent. Such
parents, while certainly well-intentioned, would not be able to satisfy
the "but for a legal barrier" requirement. Furthermore, adopting par-
ents who are aware of the abandonment theory but who also know
that the non-custodial parent will contest the adoption, are well ad-
vised to see a lawyer, who "may be able to accomplish the adoption in
spite of the absent parent's refusal to cooperate.' 63 Parents in this
situation, who are unwilling or financially unable to retain a lawyer
and proceed through litigation which may produce an adoption, might
decide to forgo the adoption. Strictly speaking, under these circum-
stances the "but for a legal barrier" requirement is not met.
160. 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 256. Family Code section 8604(b) provides that the consent of a
natural parent who has abandoned the child is not required for the child's adoption. The
section reads in full:
If one birth parent has been awarded custody by judicial order, or has custody by
agreement of both parents, and the other birth parent for a period of one year
willfully fails to communicate with and to pay for the care, support, and education
of the child when able to do so, then the birth parent having sole custody may
consent to the adoption, but only after the birth parent not having custody has
been served with a copy of a citation in the manner provided by law for the ser-
vice of a summons in a civil action that requires the birth parent not having cus-
tody to appear at the time and place set for the appearance in court under Section
8718 8823, 8913 or 9007.
CAL. FAM. CODE § 8604(b) (West 1994).
161. 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 256 n.7.
162. CAL. PROB. CODE § 6454.
163. FRANK ZAGONE & MARY RUDOLPH, How To ADOPT YOUR STEPCHILD IN CALI-
FORMA, § 3:8 (3d ed. 1987) (emphasis added).
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Thus, the Stevenson stepchildren could have lost their case as a
result of the "but for a legal barrier" requirement. Had they lost, they
would have received nothing from the estate if the decedent was sur-
vived by "issue, parent or issue of a parent, grandparent or issue of a
grandparent.' 164 In other words, the Stevenson stepchildren could
have lost their claim to an heir as remote as a first cousin thrice
removed.
The question remains, however, what exactly constitutes a rela-
tionship upon which a legitimate intestacy claim can be based. Claffey
suggests that it should be a "family relationship,"'165 but courts must
have some guidance as to what this phrase means. Professor Mahoney
proposes that reform-minded legislatures should include three re-
quirements 66 in formulating a stepfamily intestacy statute: First,
"[s]tepfamily inheritance should be permitted only when the
stepfamily is formed during the child's minority."'1 67 Second, a de facto
parent-child relationship must exist according to the common law in
loco parentis doctrine. 68 Third, Professor Mahoney concurs with sec-
tion 6454 in that the relationship must continue throughout the par-
ties' joint lifetimes.169
Even this progressive and well-intentioned statute would be too
limited to consistently achieve justice for stepchildren seeking to es-
164. CAL. PROB. CODE § 6402(e).
165. 257 Cal. Rptr. at 198-99.
166. In addition to the three requirements, Professor Mahoney's proposed statute
would also establish inheritance rights not only in stepchildren, but in stepparents as well.
Mahoney, Stepfamilies in the Law, supra note 6, at 933-34. Section 6454 expressly precludes
the possibility of stepparent inheritance rights by limiting its applicability to inheritance
"by a person or the person's issue from or through a foster parent or stepparent." CAL.
PROB. CODE § 6454 (emphasis added). Professor Mahoney's suggestion is a good one, as it
makes little sense to allow inheritance within a legitimate stepparent-stepchild relationship
to flow in one direction and not the other.
Professor Mahoney's proposed statute would also be limited to "stepparents and
stepchildren and their descendants," thereby precluding, for example, a stepuncle from
inheriting from his stepniece. Mahoney, Stepfamilies in the Law, supra note 6 at 934. This
limitation is also sound, although at first blush it appears to be opposed to Professor Maho-
ney's and this Note's argument that intestacy schemes should treat stepchildren equally
with natural and adopted children if their relationship with their stepparent was a mean-
ingful one. Without such a limitation, circumstances under which probate courts would be
overwhelmed are not hard to imagine. Consider, for example, the situation in which Dece-
dent is the stepdaughter of X, who was the stepson of Y, who was the stepmother of Z,
who was the stepfather of Claimant. To support her claim, Claimant would have to prove
that each of stepparent-stepchild relationships was a meaningful one. Given the frequency
of stepfamily relations today, such claims might not be too uncommon, and the fact-finding
burden that they would impose upon probate courts would be crushing.
167. Mahoney, Stepfamilies in the Law, supra note 6, at 930.
168. Id. at 931-32. In loco parentis means "in the place of a parent." BLACK's LAW
DICrIONARY 787 (6th ed. 1990).
169. Mahoney, Stepfamilies in the Law, supra note 6, at 932-33.
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tablish intestate succession claims. Professor Mahoney supports her
first requirement by stating that "[t]he likelihood of real family ties
between stepparent and child are remote in cases where the child has
reached adulthood at the time of his or her parent's marriage to the
stepparent."170 While it is less likely that a family relationship will
form after adulthood than during childhood, this does not mean that
family relationships could never form in such a case. Parental func-
tions do not cease when a child reaches the age of majority. Adult
children often consult their parents on such matters as career choices,
emotional crises, financial planning and relationships both personal
and professional. An automatic rejection of relationships that form
after the child has reached the age of majority cuts against this Note's
and Professor Mahoney's basic argument: intestacy schemes should
recognize that in today's society, family relationships develop in ways
that were unthought of only twenty years ago.
In addition to possible unjust exclusions of legitimate claims, the
bright-line majority age rule embodied in both section 6454 and Pro-
fessor Mahoney's proposal could lead to arbitrary results if the
stepfamily forms when some stepchildren are adults and others still
under eighteen. A better solution would be to impose a presumption
against relationship formation that increases with the child's age at the
time of the formation of the stepfamily. Under this proposal a rela-
tionship that began when a child was seventeen would be viewed with
more skepticism than a relationship that began when a child was an
infant. Under Professor Mahoney's proposal and section 6454, these
two relationships would be treated as if the child's age at the time of
formation were not a factor.
Professor Mahoney's use of the in loco parentis doctrine to deter-
mine whether the relationship was legitimate is an idea with some
merit, but this Note rejects it for two reasons. The first involves the
factors that courts have traditionally used in making in loco parentis
determinations. While Professor Mahoney is correct in noting that
some courts do consider non-economic evidence such as shared
household and performance of counseling functions in making in loco
parentis determinations,171 she does not acknowledge that courts have
often relied heavily on the economic factor of financial support of the
child.172 While a court should consider economic factors, overreliance
170. Id. at 930.
171. 1d at 931. Two opinions that set forth factors substantially similar to Professor
Mahoney's are Estate of Wilts, 145 Cal. Rptr. 759,762 (Ct. App. 1978) and Loomis v. State
of California, 39 Cal. Rptr. 820, 822-23 (Ct. App. 1964).
172. See eg., Estate of Teddy, 29 Cal. Rptr. 402, 405 (Ct. App. 1963) (noting that
"'responsibility for the support of the child"' is foremost among the obligations inherent in
standing in loco parentis) (quoting Strauss v. United States, 160 F.2d 1017 (2d Cir. 1947));
Commonwealth v. O'Connor, 555 N.E. 2d 865, 868 (Mass. 1990) (stating that the key fac-
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on such factors tends to shift the inquiry from the relationship be-
tween the parent and child to whether the child was dependent upon
the parent. The second reason for rejecting use of the in loco parentis
doctrine in the stepchild intestacy context is that it focuses solely on
the relationship between a stepparent and a minority child. As dis-
cussed above,173 placing absolute age limitations on the right to intes-
tate succession is contrary to the premise that in modem society
meaningful family relationships can develop at any age.
This Note proposes that the legislature amend section 6454 so
that the sole statutory requirement is proof of the existence of a legiti-
mate family relationship between the stepparent and the stepchild.
174
At the same time, however, section 6454's present requirements
should not be completely discarded. Rather, they should be recast as
presumptions included in the statute to guide the courts. Thus, if the
stepchild can show that the stepparent "would have adopted but for a
legal barrier," a strong presumption should arise in favor of a legiti-
mate relationship. Evidence that the relationship remained strong af-
ter the child moved away from home would also give rise to a
presumption of legitimacy. Finally, the younger the child was at the
time of the stepfamily's formation, the stronger the presumption of a
legitimate relationship.
Conclusion
In light of the growing number of people who will spend at least
some part of their lives in stepfamilies, the traditional view which ex-
cludes stepchildren from intestacy schemes is outdated and unjust.
The California legislature has attempted to rectify this injustice by en-
acting section 6454, but that statute is not the best means of determin-
ing the legitimacy of a stepchild's claim that he or she is the natural
object of the stepparent's bounty. The recent split in the California
tors to in loco parentis status are "the intent to take over the position of parent, and the
discharge of support and maintenance responsibilities toward the child"); State v. Pittard,
263 S.E. 2d 809 (N.C. App. 1980) (stating rule that the relationship of in loco parentis is
established when one with whom a child is placed takes on "the obligations incidental to
the parental relationship, particularly that of support and maintenance"). Other cases,
while not explicitly stating that financial support of the child is the main determinative of
in loco parentis status, imply as much by considering this factor before others. In re Diana
P., 424 A.2d 178, 180 (N.H. 1980); Loomis v. State of California, 39 Cal. Rptr. 820 (Ct.
App. 1964). Given that the doctrine is primarily used in the child support context, Maho-
ney, Stepfamilies in the Law, supra note 6, at 931, and that it developed as a means by
which third parties (including creditors or the state) could force a stepparent to take finan-
cial responsibility for a stepchild, Mahoney, Support and Custody Aspects, supra note 12, at
41-42, it is perhaps not surprising that courts have relied heavily on economic factors.
173. See supra text following note 170.
174. For a discussion of the presumptions and types of extrinsic evidence that a court
could use in determining the legitimacy of the relationship, see supra Part III.
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courts of appeal caused by Stevenson and Cleveland highlights the
statute's inadequacy by showing how the statute forces the courts to
stretch its plain language to achieve just results. The best possible so-
lution to the inequities caused by section 6454 is for the California
legislature to amend the statute so that probate courts may use their
discretion to examine the facts particular to each claim to determine
its legitimacy. And until the legislature takes such action, probate
courts are urged to construe the statute in such a way as to best
achieve justice whenever a deserving stepchild asserts a legitimate in-
testacy claim.

